Like this one,
Miles Kimball is a Professor at the University of Michigan, and a vocal and prolific proponent of negative interest rates. His Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal is peppered with posts on the benefits of negative interest rates.
March 2 Even Central Bankers Need Lessons on the Transmission Mechanism for Negative Interest Rates, after words of adoration, takes the Governor of the Bank of England (Mark Carney) to task. Carney’s problem? Carney wrote recently that unless regular households face negative interest rates in their deposit accounts.. negative interest rates only work through the exchange rate channel, which is zero-sum from a global point of view.
Kimball’s argument is a little esoteric, but promotes three ideas.
First, negative interest rates central bank charge member banks on reserves should be passed onto commercial and consumer customers with larger accounts – perhaps with an exemption for smaller checking and savings accounts with, say, less than $1000.
Second, moving toward electronic money in all transactions makes administration of negative interest rates easier and more effective. In that regard, it may be necessary to tax transactions conducted in paper money, if a negative interest rate regime is in force.
Third, impacts on bank profits can be mitigated by providing subsidies to banks in the event the central bank moved into negative interest rate territory.
Fundamentally, Kimball’s view is that.. monetary policy–and full-scale negative interest rate policy in particular–is the primary answer to the problem of insufficient aggregate demand. No need to set inflation targets above zero in order to get the economy moving. Just implement sufficiently negative interest rates and things will rebound quickly.
Kimball’s vulnerability is high mathematical excellence coupled with a casual attitude toward details of actual economic institutions and arrangements.
For example, in his Carney post, Kimball offers this rather tortured prose under the heading -“Why Wealth Effects Would Be Zero With a Representative Household” –
It is worth clarifying why the wealth effects from interest rate changes would have to be zero if everyone were identical [sic, emphasis mine]. In aggregate, the material balance condition ensures that flow of payments from human and physical capital have not only the same present value but the same time path and stochastic pattern as consumption. Thus–apart from any expansion of the production of the economy as a whole as a result of the change in monetary policy–any effect of interest rate changes on the present value of society’s assets overall is cancelled out by the effect of interest rate changes on the present value of the planned path and pattern of consumption. Of course, what is actually done will be affected by the change in interest rates, but the envelope theorem says that the wealth effects can be calculated based on flow of payments and consumption flows that were planned initially.
That’s in case you worried a regime of -2 percent negative interest rates – which Kimball endorses to bring a speedy end to economic stagnation – could collapse the life insurance industry or wipe out pension funds.
And this paragraph is troubling from another standpoint, since Kimball believes negative interest rates or “monetary policy” can trigger “expansion of the production of the economy as a whole.” So what about those wealth effects?
Indeed, later in the Carney post he writes,
..for any central bank willing to go off the paper standard, there is no limit to how low interest rates can go other than the danger of overheating the economy with too strong an economic recovery. If starting from current conditions, any country can maintain interest rates at -7% or lower for two years without overheating its economy, then I am wrong about the power of negative interest rates. But in fact, I think it will not take that much. -2% would do a great deal of good for the eurozone or Japan, and -4% for a year and a half would probably be enough to do the trick of providing more than enough aggregate demand.
At the end of the Carney post, Kimball links to a list of his and other writings on negative interest rates called How and Why to Eliminate the Zero Lower Bound: A Reader’s Guide. Worth bookmarking.
Here’s a YouTube video.
Although not completely fair, I have to say all this reminds me of a widely-quoted passage from Keynes’ General Theory –
“Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back”
Of course, the policy issue behind the spreading adoption of negative interest rates is that the central banks of the world are, in many countries, at the zero bound already. Thus, unless central banks can move into negative interest rate territory, governments are more or less “out of ammunition” when it comes to combatting the next recession – assuming, of course, that political alignments currently favoring austerity over infrastructure investment and so forth, are still in control.
The problem I have might be posed as one of “complexity theory.”
I myself have spent hours pouring over optimal control models of consumption and dynamic general equilibrium. This stuff is so rarified and intellectually challenging, really, that it produces a mindset that suggests mastery of Portryagin’s maximum principle in a multi-equation setup means you have something relevant to say about real economic affairs. In fact, this may be doubtful, especially when the linkages between organizations are so complex, especially dynamically.
The problem, indeed, may be institutional but from a different angle. Economics departments in universities have, as their main consumer, business school students. So economists have to offer something different.
One would hope machine learning, Big Data, and the new predictive analytics, framed along the lines outlined by Hal Varian and others, could provide an alternative paradigm for economists – possibly rescuing them from reliance on adjusting one number in equations that are stripped of the real, concrete details of economic linkages.
What are we to make of negative interest rates?
Burton Malkiel (Princeton) writes in the Library of Economics and Liberty that – The rate of interest measures the percentage reward a lender receives for deferring the consumption of resources until a future date. Correspondingly, it measures the price a borrower pays to have resources now.
So, in a topsy-turvy world, negative interest rates might measure the penalty a lender receives for delaying consumption of resources to some future date from a more near-term date, or from now.
This is more or less the idea of this unconventional monetary policy, now taking hold in the environs of the European and Japanese Central Banks, and possibly spreading sometime soon to your local financial institution. Thus, one of the strange features of business behavior since the Great Recession of 2008-2009 has been the hoarding of cash either in the form of retained corporate earnings or excess bank reserves.
So, in practical terms, a negative interest rate flips the relation between depositors and banks.
With negative interest rates, instead of receiving money on deposits, depositors must pay regular sums, based on the size of their deposits, to keep their money with the bank.
The Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank and several smaller European authorities have ventured into this once-uncharted territory recently.
The Bank of Japan surprised markets Jan. 29 by adopting a negative interest-rate strategy. The move came 1 1/2 years after the European Central Bank became the first major central bank to venture below zero. With the fallout limited so far, policy makers are more willing to accept sub-zero rates. The ECB cut a key rate further into negative territory Dec. 3, even though President Mario Draghi earlier said it had hit the “lower bound.” It now charges banks 0.3 percent to hold their cash overnight. Sweden also has negative rates, Denmark used them to protect its currency’s peg to the euro and Switzerland moved its deposit rate below zero for the first time since the 1970s. Since central banks provide a benchmark for all borrowing costs, negative rates spread to a range of fixed-income securities. By the end of 2015, about a third of the debt issued by euro zone governments had negative yields. That means investors holding to maturity won’t get all their money back. Banks have been reluctant to pass on negative rates for fear of losing customers, though Julius Baer began to charge large depositors.
These developments have triggered significant criticism and concern in the financial community.
The Japanese government got paid to borrow money for a decade for the first time, selling 2.2 trillion yen ($19.5 billion) of the debt at an average yield of minus 0.024 percent on Tuesday…
The central bank buys as much as 12 trillion yen of the nation’s government debt a month…
Life insurance companies, for instance, take in premiums today and invest them to be able to cover their obligations when policyholders eventually die. They price their policies on the assumption of a mid-single-digit positive return on their bond portfolios. Turn that return negative and all of a sudden the world’s life insurers are either unprofitable or insolvent. And that’s a big industry.
Pension funds, meanwhile, operate the same way, taking in and investing contributions against future obligations. Many US pension plans are already borderline broke, and in a NIRP environment they’ll suffer a mass extinction. Again, big industry, many employees, huge potential impact on both Wall Street and Main Street.
It has to be noted, however, that real (or inflation-adjusted) interest rates have gone below zero already for certain asset classes. Thus, a highlight of the Bank of England Study on negative interest rates circa 2013 is this chart, showing the emergence of negative real interest rates.
Are these developments the canary in the mine?
We really need some theoretical analysis from the economics community – perspectives that encompass developments like the advent of China as a major player in world markets and patterns of debt expansion and servicing in the older industrial nations.
There is a topic I think you can call the “structure of randomness.” Power laws are included, as are various “arcsine laws” governing the probability of leads and changes in scores in competitive games and, of course, in winnings from gambling.
I ran onto a recent article showing how basketball scores follow arcsine laws.
Safe Leads and Lead Changes in Competitive Team Sports is based on comprehensive data from league games over several seasons in the National Basketball Association (NBA).
“..we find that many …statistical properties are explained by modeling the evolution of the lead time X as a simple random walk. More strikingly, seemingly unrelated properties of lead statistics, specifically, the distribution of the times t: (i) for which one team is leading..(ii) for the last lead change..(and (iii) when the maximal lead occurs, are all described by the ..celebrated arcsine law..”
The chart below shows the arcsine probability distribution function (PDF). This probability curve is almost the opposite or reverse of the widely known normal probability distribution. Instead of a bell-shape with a maximum probability in the middle, the arcsine distribution has the unusual property that probabilities are greatest at the lower and upper bounds of the range. Of course, what makes both curves probability distributions is that the area they span adds up to 1.
So, apparently, the distribution of time that a basketball team holds a lead in a basketball game is well-described by the arcsine distribution. This means lead changes are most likely at the beginning and end of the game, and least likely in the middle.
An earlier piece in the Financial Analysts Journal (The Arc Sine Law and the Treasure Bill Futures Market) notes,
..when two sports teams play, even though they have equal ability, the arc sine law dictates that one team will probably be in the lead most of the game. But the law also says that games with a close final score are surprisingly likely to be “last minute, come from behind” affairs, in which the ultimate winner trailed for most of the game..[Thus] over a series of games in which close final scores are common, one team could easily achieve a string of several last minute victories. The coach of such a team might be credited with being brilliantly talented, for having created a “second half” team..[although] there is a good possibility that he owes his success to chance.
There is nice mathematics underlying all this.
The name “arc sine distribution” derives from the integration of the PDF in the chart – a PDF which has the formula –
f(x) = 1/(π (x(1-x).5)
Here, the integral of f(x) yields the cumulative distribution function F(x) and involves an arcsine function,
F(x) = 2/(π arcsin(x.5))
Fundamentally, the arcsine law relates to processes where there are probabilities of winning and losing in sequential trials. The PDF follows from the application of Stirling’s formula to estimate expressions with factorials, such as the combination of p+q things taken p at a time, which quickly becomes computationally cumbersome as p+q increases in size.
There is probably no better introduction to the relevant mathematics than Feller’s exposition in his classic An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Volume I.
Feller had an unusual ability to write lucidly about mathematics. His Chapter III “Fluctuations in Coin Tossing and Random Walks” in IPTAIA is remarkable, as I have again convinced myself by returning to study it again.
He starts out this Chapter III with comments:
We shall encounter theoretical conclusions which not only are unexpected but actually come as a shock to intuition and common sense. They will reveal that commonly accepted motions concerning chance fluctuations are without foundation and that the implications of the law of large numbers are widely misconstrued. For example, in various applications it is assumed that observations on an individual coin-tossing game during a long time interval will yield the same statistical characteristics as the observation of the results of a huge number of independent games at one given instant. This is not so..
Most pointedly, for example, “contrary to popular opinion, it is quite likely that in a long coin-tossing game one of the players remains practically the whole time on the winning side, the other on the losing side.”
The same underlying mathematics produces the Ballot Theorem, which states the chances a candidate will be ahead from an early point in vote counting, based on the final number of votes for that candidate.
This application, of course, comes very much to the fore in TV coverage of the results of on-going primaries at the present time. CNN’s initial announcement, for example, that Bernie Sanders beat Hillary Clinton in the New Hampshire primary came when less than half the precincts had reported in their vote totals.
In returning to Feller’s Volume 1, I recommend something like Sholmo Sternberg’s Lecture 8. If you read Feller, you have to be prepared to make little derivations to see the links between formulas. Sternberg cleared up some puzzles for me, which, alas, otherwise might have absorbed hours of my time.
The arc sine law may be significant for social and economic inequality, which perhaps can be considered in another post.
Forecasts in business are unavoidable, since decisions must be made for annual budgets and shorter term operational plans, and investments must be made.
And regardless of approach, practical problems arise.
For example, should output from formal algorithms be massaged, so final numbers include judgmental revisions? What about error metrics? Is the mean absolute percent error (MAPE) best, because everybody is familiar with percents? What are plus’es and minus’es of various forecast error metrics? And, organizationally, where should forecasting teams sit – marketing, production, finance, or maybe in a free-standing unit?
The editors of Business Forecasting – Practical Problems and Solutions integrate dozens of selections to focus on these and other practical forecasting questions.
Here are some highlights.
In my experience, many corporate managers, even VP’s and executives, understand surprisingly little about fitting models to data.
So guidelines for reporting results are important.
In “Dos and Don’ts of Forecast Accuracy Measurement: A Tutorial,” Len Tashman advises “distinguish in-sample from out-of-sample accuracy,” calling it “the most basic issue.”
The acid test is how well the forecast model does “out-of-sample.” Holdout samples and cross-validation simulate how the forecast model will perform going forward. “If your average error in-sample is found to be 10%, it is very probable that forecast errors will average substantially more than 10%.” That’s because model parameters are calibrated to the sample over which they are estimated. There is a whole discussion of “over-fitting,” R2, and model complexity hinging on similar issues. Don’t fool yourself. Try to find ways to test your forecast model on out-of-sample data.
The discussion of fitting models when there is “extreme seasonality” broke new ground for me. In retail forecasting, there might be a toy or product that sells only at Christmastime. Demand is highly intermittent. As Udo Sglavo reveals, one solution is “time compression.” Collapse the time series data into two periods – the holiday season and the rest of the year. Then, the on-off characteristics of sales can be more adequately modeled. Clever.
John Mello’s “The Impact of Sales Forecast Game Playing on Supply Chains,” is probably destined to be a kind of classic, since it rolls up a lot of what we have all heard and observed about strategic behavior vis a vis forecasts.
Mello describes stratagems including
I’ve seen “sand-bagging” at work, when the salesforce is allowed to generate the forecasts, setting expectations for future sales lower than should, objectively, be the case. Purely by coincidence, of course, sales quotas are then easier to meet and bonuses easier to achieve.
I’ve always wondered why Gonik’s system, mentioned in an accompanying article by Michael Gilliland on the “Role of the Sales Force in Forecasting,” is not deployed more often. Gonik, in a classic article in the Harvard Business Review, ties sales bonuses jointly to the level of sales that are forecast by the field, and also to how well actual sales match the forecasts that were made. It literally provides incentives for field sales staff to come up with their best, objective estimate of sales in the coming period. (See Sales Forecasts and Incentives)
Finally, Larry Lapide’s “Where Should the Forecasting Function Reside?” asks a really good question.
The following graphic (apologies for the scan reproduction) summarizes some of his key points.
There is no fixed answer, Lapide provides a list of things to consider for each organization.
This book is a good accompaniment for Rob Hyndman and George Athanasopoulos’s online Forecasting: Principles and Practice.
The Dallas Federal Reserve Bank highlights the impact of continuing declines in oil prices in their latest monthly Texas Manufacturing Outlook Survey:
Texas factory activity fell sharply in January, according to business executives responding to the Texas Manufacturing Outlook Survey. The production index—a key measure of state manufacturing conditions—dropped 23 points, from 12.7 to -10.2, suggesting output declined this month after growing throughout fourth quarter 2015.
Other indexes of current manufacturing activity also indicated contraction in January. The survey’s demand measures—the new orders index and the growth rate of orders index—led the falloff in production with negative readings last month, and these indexes pushed further negative in January. The new orders index edged down to -9.2, and the growth rate of orders index fell to -17.5, its lowest level in a year. The capacity utilization index fell 15 points from 8.1 to -7, and the shipments index also posted a double-digit decline into negative territory, coming in at -11.
Perceptions of broader business conditions weakened markedly in January. The general business activity and company outlook indexes fell to their lowest readings since April 2009, when Texas was in recession. The general business activity index fell 13 points to -34.6, and the company outlook index slipped to -19.5.
Here is a chart showing the Texas monthly manufacturing index.
The logical follow-on question is raised by James Hamilton – Can lower oil prices cause a recession?
Hamilton cites an NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) paper – Geographic Dispersion of Economic Shocks: Evidence from the Fracking Revolution – which estimates jobs from fracking (hydraulic fracturing of oil deposits) resulted in more than 700,000 US jobs 2008-2009, resulting in an 0.5 percent decrease in the unemployment rate during that dire time.
Obviously, the whole thing works in reverse, too.
Eight states with a high concentration of energy-related jobs – including Texas and North Dakota – have experienced major impacts in terms of employment and tax revenues. See “Plunging oil prices: a boost for the U.S. economy, a jolt for Texas”.
Another question is how long can US-based producers hold out financially, as the price of crude continues to spiral down? See Half of U.S. Fracking Industry Could Go Bankrupt as Oil Prices Continue to Fall.
I’ve seen some talk that problems in the oil patch may play a role analogous to sub-prime mortgages during the last economic contraction.
In terms of geopolitics, there is evidence the Saudi’s, who dominate OPEC, triggered the price decline by refusing to limit production from their fields.
Generally, a recession occurs when real, or inflation-adjusted Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shows negative growth for at least two consecutive quarters. But GDP estimates are available only at a lag, so it’s possible for a recession to be underway without confirmation from the national statistics.
Bottom line – go to the US Bureau of Economics Analysis website, click on the “National” tab, and you can get the latest official GDP estimates. Today, (January 25, 2016) this box announces “3rd Quarter 2015 GDP,” and we must wait until January 29th for “advance numbers” on the fourth quarter 2015 – numbers to be revised perhaps twice in two later monthly releases.
This means higher frequency data must be deployed for real-time information about GDP growth. And while there are many places with whole bunches of charts, what we really want is systematic analysis, or nowcasting.
A couple of initiatives at nowcasting US real GDP show that, as of December 2015, a recession is not underway, although the indications are growth is below trend and may be slowing.
This information comes from research departments of the US Federal Reserve Bank – the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta GDPNow model.
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) for December 2015, released January 22nd, shows an improvement over November. The CFNAI moved –0.22 in December, up from –0.36 in November, and, in the big picture (see below) this number does not signal recession.
The index is a weighted average of 85 existing monthly indicators of national economic activity from four general categories – production and income; employment, unemployment, and hours; personal consumption and housing; and sales, orders, and inventories.
It’s built – with Big Data techniques, incidentally- to have an average value of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Since economic activity trends up over time, generally, the zero for the CFNAI actually indicates growth above trend, while a negative index indicates growth below trend.
Recession levels are lower than the December 2015 number – probably starting around -0.7.
The GDPNow Model is developed at the Federal Reserve bank of Atlanta.
On January 20, the GDPNow site announced,
The GDPNow model forecast for real GDP growth (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the fourth quarter of 2015 is 0.7 percent on January 20, up from 0.6 percent on January 15. The forecasts for fourth quarter real consumer spending growth and real residential investment growth each increased slightly after this morning’s Consumer Price Index release from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the report on new residential construction from the U.S. Census Bureau.
The chart accompanying this accouncement shows a somewhat less sanguine possibility – namely that consensus estimates and the output of the GDPNow model have been on a downward trend if you look at things back to September 2015.
Philip Tetlock’s recent Superforecasting says, basically, some people do better at forecasting than others and, furthermore, networking higher performing forecasters, providing access to pooled data, can produce impressive results.
This is a change from Tetlock’s first study – Expert Political Judgment – which lasted about twenty years, concluding, famously, ‘the average expert was roughly as accurate as a dart-throwing chimpanzee.”
Tetlock’s recent research comes out of a tournament sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA). This forecasting competition fits with the mission of IARPA, which is to improve assessments by the “intelligence community,” or IC. The IC is a generic label, according to Tetlock, for “the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and thirteen other agencies.”
It is relevant that the IC is surmised (exact figures are classified) to have “a budget of more than $50 billion .. [and employ] one hundred thousand people.”
Thus, “Think how shocking it would be to the intelligence professionals who have spent their lives forecasting geopolical events – to be beaten by a few hundred ordinary people and some simple algorithms.”
Of course, Tetlock reports, this actually happened – “Thanks to IARPA, we now know a few hundred ordinary people and some simple math can not only compete with professionals supported by multibillion-dollar apparatus but also beat them.”
IARPA’s motivation, apparently, traces back to the “weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” uproar surrounding the Iraq war –
“After invading in 2003, the United States turned Iraq upside down looking for WMD’s but found nothing. It was one of the worst – arguable the worst – intelligence failure in modern history. The IC was humiliated. There were condemnations in the media, official investigations, and the familiar ritual of intelligence officials sitting in hearings ..”
So the IC needs improved methods, including utilizing “the wisdom of crowds” and practices of Tetlock’s “superforecaster” teams.
Unlike the famous M-competitions, the IARPA tournament collates subjective assessments of geopolitical risk, such as “will there be a fatal confrontation between vessels in the South China Sea” or “Will either the French or Swiss inquiries find elevated levels of polonium in the remains of Yasser Arafat’s body?”
Tetlock’s book is entertaining and thought-provoking, but many in business will page directly to the Appendix – Ten Commandments for Aspiring Superforecasters.
Puckishly, Tetlocks adds an 11th Commandment – don’t treat commandments as commandments.
Great topic – forecasting subjective geopolitical developments in teams. Superforecasting touches on some fairly subtle points, illustrated with examples. I think it is well worth having on the bookshelf.
There are some corkers, too, like when Tetlock’s highlights the recommendations of 2nd Century physician to Roman emperors Galen, the medical authority for more than 1000 years.
Galen once wrote, apparently,
“All who drink of this treatment recover in a short time, except those whom it does not help, who all die…It is obvious, therefore, that it fails only in incurable cases.”
It’s time to invoke the parable of the fox and the hedgehog. You know – the hedgehog knows one thing, sees the world through the lens of a single commanding idea, while the fox knows many things, entertains diverse, even conflicting points of view.
This is apropos of my reaction to David Stockman’s The Fed’s Painted Itself Into The Most Dangerous Corner In History—–Why There Will Soon Be A Riot In The Casino.
Stockman, former Director of Office of Management and Budget under President Ronald Reagan who later launched into a volatile career in high finance (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Stockman) currently lends his name to and writes for a spicy website called Contra Corner.
Stockman’s “Why There Will Soon Be a Riot in The Casino” pivots on an Op Ed by Lawrence Summers (Preparing for the next recession) as well as the following somewhat incredible chart, apparently developed from IMF data by Contra Corner researchers.
The storyline is that planetary production fell in current dollar terms in 2015. This isn’t because physical output or hours in service dropped, but because of the precipitous drop in commodity prices and the general pattern of deflation.
All this is apropos of the Fed’s coming decision to raise the federal funds rate from the zero bound (really from about 0.25 percent).
The logic is unassailable. As Summers (former US Treasury Secretary, former President of Harvard, and Professor of Economics at Harvard) writes –
U.S. and international experience suggests that once a recovery is mature, the odds that it will end within two years are about half and that it will end in less than three years are over two-thirds. Because normal growth is now below 2 percent rather than near 3 percent, as has been the case historically, the risk may even be greater now. While the risk of recession may seem remote given recent growth, it bears emphasizing that since World War II, no postwar recession has been predicted a year in advance by the Fed, the White House or the consensus forecast.
Historical experience suggests that when recession comes it is necessary to cut interest rates by more than 300 basis points. I agree with the market that the Fed likely will not be able to raise rates by 100 basis points a year without threatening to undermine the recovery. But even if this were possible, the chances are very high that recession will come before there is room to cut rates by enough to offset it. The knowledge that this is the case must surely reduce confidence and inhibit demand.
So let me rephrase this, to underline the points.
Header pic of fox and hedgehog from willpowered.co.
It is widely expected the US Federal Reserve Bank will raise the federal funds rate from its seven-year low below 0.25 percent to maybe 0.50 percent. Then, further increases will bring this key short term rate back in line with its historic profile gradually, depending on the health of the US economy and international factors.
This will probably occur next week at the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), December 15-16.
Here’s a chart from the excellent St. Louis Federal Reserve data site (FRED) showing how unusual recent years are in terms of this key interest rate.
Shading in the chart indicates periods of recession.
Thus, the federal funds rate – which is the rate charged on overnight loans to banking members of the Federal Reserve system – was pushed to the zero bound as a response to the financial crisis and recession 2008-2009.
A December increase has been discussed by prominent members of the Federal Open Market Committee and, of course, in Janet Yellen’s testimony before the US Congress, December 3.
Yet discussion still considers the balance between ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ on the FOMC. Next year, apparently, FOMC membership may shift toward more ‘hawks’ in voting positions – bankers who see inflation risks from the current recovery. See, for example, Richard Grossman’s Birdwatching at the Federal Reserve.
How far will interest rates rise? One way to address this is by considering the Fed funds futures contract. Currently, the CME futures data indicate a rise to 1.73% over the next 36 months.
All this seems long overdue, based on historical interest rate levels, but that does not stop some alarmist talk.
As a result, our only question for the upcoming Fed rate hike is how long it will take before the Fed, shortly after increasing rates by a modest 25 bps to “prove” to itself if not so much anyone else that the US economy is fine, will be forced to mainline trillions of dollars around the globe via swap lines for the second time in a row as the world experiences the biggest USD margin call in history.
By the end of next week or probably just after the first of 2016, interest rates may move a little from the zero bound, and from then on, one fulcrum of all business and economic forecasts will be the pace of further increases.